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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises from a transfer of real property in which appellants, Robert and Becky
Humphries (the "Humphries") claim that the respondents, Eileen Becker, Allen Becker, and Jane
Becker (collectively the "Beckers") committed fraud by misrepresenting, concealing, and/or failing
to disclose material information with regards to the source of water to the property and the
functionality of the sprinkler system. Despite making representations about the source of water for
the real property, the Beckers did not disclose that the sprinkler/irrigation water came from a source
to which they had no rights. In addition, they represented that the sprinklers were fully automatic
when, in fact, they were not.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Humphries filed suit against the Beckers in this case and alleged two counts of Fraud,
Misrepresentation, and Fraudulent Inducement of Contract, and one count of a violation of the
Idaho Property Disclosure Act. On the Beckers' motion for summary judgment, the district court
granted summary judgment against the Humphries, determining that the Beckers did not make any
false representations and therefore, the Humphries could not recover on their claims.' The
Humphries moved the district court to reconsider, and the district court denied the Humphries'
motion. More specific information regarding the proceedings will be addressed in the Statement of
Facts, below.

1 The district court only ruled on whether the representations were false. Therefore, that is the only element of the
Humphrieses' claims that is addressed in this appeal.
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C.

Statement of Facts.
Allen and Jane Becker owned a one-acre property (the "Property"). R. MD 2, L. 20. 2 The

Property had two sources of water. Id. 3, L. 10-12. The water delivered to the house on the Property
originated from a well ("Shared Well") that was located on the neighboring property ("Shared Well
Property") of Eileen Becker. Id. The water servicing the sprinkler system for the yard, however,
originated from a neighboring farmer's well and pivot (the "Farm Well"). Id. The Beckers had no
legal right to that Farm Well or the water derived therefrom. R. 88, L. 5-8. The Property itself had
no inherent rights to the farm water either. Id. Before selling the property, Allen Becker inquired as
to how much it would cost to obtain a well to support the Property itself. R. 266, P. 36 L. 14

P. 37

L. 7. After finding out it would cost approximately $30,000.00, Allen decided not to put a separate
well on the Property. Id. at 267, P. 37 L. 1-7, P. 41, L. 14-17. The sprinkler system connected to the
Farm Well was partially automatic, with five of the seven stations requiring manual starting and
stopping. R. 89, L. 15-16, R. 90, L. 20-23.
In late 2008, Allen and Jane traded Eileen the Property for the Shared Well Property. R.
MD. 2, L. 21-23, R. 264, P. 24, L. 1-15. Eileen never lived at the Property before listing the
property for sale. R. MD. 2 L. 23, P. 3 L. 1. Having lived at the adjacent Shared Well Property,
Eileen knew that the sprinkler water for the Property came from the Farm Well and not the Shared
Well. R. 82, L. 25, R. 83, L. 1-7. Eileen enlisted the help of Sheila Adams, a realtor, to sell the
Property. R. MD. 3, L. 3-5, R. 257, P. 55, L. 10-25, P. 56, L. 1-3. During the listing and sale
The district court's Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants' (Eileen, Allen, and Jane Becker) Motion for
Summary Judgment was not included in the original record. Upon stipulation of the parties, the record was
augmented with this document. As Appellants are unaware what the official designation of this document will be, it
will be referred to as "R. MD."
2
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process, Allen and Jane Becker also acted as "middlemen" and representatives of Eileen. R. MD. 3,
L. 4-5. R. 80, L. 21-25, R. 81, 1-11. The Beckers provided information to Ms. Adams in order to list

the Property for sale. R. MD. 3, L. 4-5, R. 78-81, 92. Specifically, Ms. Adams testified that the
Beckers told her that when Allen and Jane owned the Property, they would use the Farm Well but
that the use would not continue because the Beckers did not have a right to it. R. 379, L. 1-16, R.
472, L. 20-22, R. 473, L. 1-5. The Beckers represented to Ms. Adams that the Shared Well could
provide water to the Property's yard, so long as everything else was not turned on at the same time.
R. 473, L. 5-7, R. 492, L. 15-18. Ms. Adams understood from the Beckers' characterizations of the

sources of water, that the water from the Farm Well had been merely supplementary and was not
necessary to meet the Property's water needs. R. 718, L. 15-22. Ms. Adams also believed, based
upon the Beckers' representations, that the Shared Well was connected to the sprinklers and the
source for the irrigation water. R. 497, L. 4-9. This was false as the sprinklers received their water
from the Farm Well since 1983. R. 265, P. 28, L. 6-12. Ms. Adams understood that there was only
one source of water, the Shared Well, for the entire Property. R. 490, L. 2-17. Allen Becker knew
that the pipe from the Shared Well to the Property was only an inch in diameter and was never
intended to run the sprinkler system. R. 520, L. 10-15.
Based upon the information provided by the Beckers, Ms. Adams created a listing (the
"Listing") wherein under "Water" it states "Shared Well," and under "La\\n Sprinklers" it states
"Auto" and "Full." R. 101. The Listing goes on to state, "Well shared with Becker home to the
south on agreement being drawn." Id. The Listing contains nothing that would indicate that the
Shared Well was not connected to the sprinklers or that the Farm Well was the source of water to
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the sprinklers, much less that the seller did not have rights to the Farm Well Water. Id. The Beckers
knew that prospective buyers would rely upon that listing for information about the property. R. 75,
L. 3-14, R. 79, L. 1-5, 92, L. 2-12. Eileen authorized Ms. Adams to publish the Listing. R. 78, L. 2225.
On about October 7, 2008, Eileen signed a RE-25 Seller's Property Condition Disclosure
Form (the "Disclosure") and adopted the statements therein. R. 83, L. 12-14, R. 104-107. On the
second page of the Disclosure, both the domestic water and irrigation water are checked off as being
provided by a "Private System." R. 105. There is no indication as to what that private system is, that
there were actually two different systems (i.e. Shared Well and Farm Well), or that the seller lacked
rights to the water connected to the sprinkler system. Id. Ms. Adams believed that the Disclosure
was accurate because she understood that there was only one source, the Shared Well, of water for
the Property. R. 498. L. 5-23. Ms. Adams acknowledged that had she known that the Farm Well
supplied the water for the sprinklers, "Other" would have been the more appropriate selection on the
Disclosure. R. 509, L. 13-18.
Toward the end of 2008, Ms. Adams retired and another real estate agent, Jerry Hines, took
over the representation for the Property. R. 474. L. 12-15. Mr. Hines acknowledged that had he been
an agent representing a buyer for the Property and reviewed the Listing and Disclosure, he would
have assumed that the sprinklers were attached to the Shared Well. R. 641, L. 5-12. He also
acknowledged that the Beckers should have disclosed that the sprinkler system was not connected to
the Shared Well. R. 641, L. 13-22.
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The Humphries were interested in the Property and reviewed the Listing and the Disclosure
prior to making an offer. R. 458, L. 4-8. Based upon the Humphries' visit and review of the
documents, they were led to believe that the Shared Well was the only source of water to the
property. R. 458, L. 9-13. The Humphries submitted an offer on the Property, and it was accepted.
This was the Humphrieses' first home. R. 231, L. 20-25, R. 249, L. 15. The Humphries hired an
inspector, who reviewed the Property at a time when the ground was covered in snow. R. 556, L. 123. After the inspection, the Humphries negotiated a price reduction for issues that came back
unsafe or deficient. R. 231, L. 18-25, R. 232, L. 1-6. The inspector did not test the sprinkler system
due to the exterior temperature. R. 412. However, the inspector was also under the assumption that
the sprinklers were fully automatic. Id. Ms. Adams also agreed that there was no way to test the
sprinkler system at the time of year when the Humphries purchased the Property. R. 510, L. 10-13.
Robert Humphries testified that had the Humphries known the true information about the
sources of water and the sprinklers, the Humphries would not have purchased the Property or would
have offered significantly less for it. R. 458, L. 23, R. 459, L. 1-3. Ms. Adams recognized that the
Humphries would have had no way of knowing about the Farm Well from the documents she
prepared. R. 494, L. 17-20. Allen Becker also acknowledged that he did not know how the
Humphries could have known about the two separate sources of water based upon the information
provided in the Listing and Disclosure. R. 529, 12-23.
Eileen sold the Property to the Humphries on February 10, 2009. R. MD. 3, L. 1-2. At
closing, the Humphries were introduced to the Shared Well Agreement (the "Agreement"). R. 652,
L. 4-5. The Agreement addresses the Shared Well on the Shared Well Property that provides
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"domestic water" to Shared Well Property and the Property. R. 185-88. At no place in the
Agreement does it provide a definition of "domestic water" or "domestic purposes." R. 185-88. At
the time of closing, the Humphries believed that the Agreement covered water usage for the entire
Property. R. 558, L. 22-25, R. 606, L. 7-25. In fact, neither Mr. Hines nor Ms. Adams, both of
whom are experienced real estate agents, knew the exact extent of what "domestic purposes" would
mean. R. 392, L. 16-25, R. 93, L. 1-5, R. 402, L. 23-25, R. 403, L. 1-12.
The Humphries filed a complaint against Eileen Becker. During the proceedings, the
Humphries moved to amend the complaint to add Allen and Jane Becker as defendants and to add a
claim of punitive damages. R. 33-34. Eileen Becker, who was the only defendant at the time of the
motion, opposed the motion taking the position that the representations of "Shared Well" on the
Listing and "Private" on the Disclosure for irrigation water were technically correct and therefore
not misrepresentations as the Farm Well was shared and private, even though neither the Property
nor seller had any right to it. Tr. 9-11. Eileen also argued that the Agreement signed at closing
limited the Shared Well use to domestic purposes only. Tr. 9, L. 19-22. Despite Eileen's arguments,
the district court ruled that there was "a reasonable likelihood of proving the facts that meet the
standard that by clear and convincing evidence the defendant acted fraudulently, oppressively, what
have you." Tr. 22, L. 11-15.
Subsequently, the Beckers moved for summary judgment. R. 135-137. The court granted
summary judgment. See, generally, R. MD. In so ruling, the district court noted that the reference to
a "private system" was a true statement as the Farm Well was private and, if the sprinklers were
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connected to the Shared Well, that the Shared Well would also be a private system. R. MD 7, L. 1014. The court determined that the representation was, therefore, not false. Id.
The district court also held that the Listing reference to a "Shared Well" was not a false
statement. R. MD. 8-9. The district court then determined that the Agreement "was sufficient
disclosure of the source of irrigation water to satisfy any duty of disclosure the Beckers may have
had." R. MD. 9, L. 22-23. In order to reach this conclusion, the district court employed a definition
of "domestic purposes" found in Idaho Code§ 42-111(1) without any discussion as to why or how
that definition applied to the Agreement. R. MD. 8, L. 22-23, P. 9, L. 1-6.
Finally, as to the automatic nature of the sprinklers, the district court found that [t]here is no
evidence indicating that the Humphries placed considerable import on the fully automatic system"
and ruled that whether the sprinklers were automatic was not material. Id. at 11, L. 3-5, 15-17.
The Humphries filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that issues of material fact
remained and that evidence existed, in the form of testimony from Robert Humphries, as to the
materiality of the automatic sprinkler system to the Humphries. R. 658-73. The district court held,
again, that the representations were not false because the source of the irrigation water was a private
system, "regardless of whether the water comes from the farm well or the shared well." R. 699, L.
8-9. The district court also addressed Robert Humphries' testimony, acknowledging that the court
found the testimony "unpersuasive" and unsupported by specific facts. R. 700, L. 7-10. The district
court entered judgment in favor of the Beckers and awarded them attorney's fees and costs. R. 736,
746-52, 758.
The Humphries filed this appeal.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court err in finding that, as a matter of law, no issue of material fact existed
as to the Humphries' fraud claims?

2.

Did the district court err in finding that, as a matter of law, no issue of material fact existed
as to the Humphries' Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act?

3.

Did the district court err in granting an award of attorney's fees to the Beckers?

4.

Are the Humphries entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal based upon
the underlying contract and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In evaluating the record on appeal from a
summary judgment, the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Bunker Hill Co. v. United

Steelworkers ofAmerica, 107 Idaho 155,157,686 P.2d 835,837 (1984). On appeal, the Court is
to "liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to
draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonrnoving party." Anderson v.

City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,179,731 P.2d 171, 174 (1986). "Circumstantial evidence can
create a genuine issue of material fact." Id. If conflicting inferences can be drawn from the
evidence and reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
denied. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979). "All doubts are to be
resolved against the moving party .... " G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808
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P .2d 851, 854 ( 1990). "The burden at all times is upon the moving party to prove the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact." Id.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE HUMPHRIESES' FRAUD CLAIMS.

A.

The evidence in the record demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to what representations were made by the Beckers.
The district court granted summary judgment, determining that the Beckers'

representations were not false. The district court erred when it determined the meaning and
significance of the Beckers' representations. Through the Disclosure, the Beckers represented
that the irrigation water was provided by a "private" system. R. MD. 7, L. 7-10. The district
court determined that this statement was true because 1) the irrigation water was supplied by a
"private" source-that of the neighboring Farm Well and 2) the irrigation water "could also be
provided" by the Shared Well. R. MD 7, L. 10-14. Through the Listing, the Beckers disclosed
only one source of water to the property-the "shared well." The district court determined that
the Disclosure was either 1) truthful because the Shared Well did provide water to the property
or 2) cured by the Agreement. R. MD 8-10.
1.

The Disclosure, at minimum. creates an ambiguity to be resolved by the jury.

The district court improperly granted summary judgment because there are genuine
issues of material fact concerning what representations were made in the Disclosure, which
Disclosure, at a minimum, created an ambiguity. A representation is ambiguous as a matter of
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law when it is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations. See Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho
212, 192 P .3d 1036 (2008) (holding that the question of whether an instrument is ambiguous is a
question of law and that an instrument is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation).
"Ambiguity in a representation presents questions of fact for determination by the jury as
to the meaning of the statement, and the meaning which the person making intended it should
convey to the person to whom it was made." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 59. By
evaluating the "truthfulness" of the representation, the district court considered two possible
meanings for the representation-that it meant the Farm Well or the Shared Well. R. MD. 7 The
fact that there are two possible meanings that may be attached to that representation renders it
ambiguous and creates a question of fact for the jury to determine. Additionally, both meanings
are either false or misleading, creating another issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment.
If the Disclosure's representation of a "Private System" was intended to reference the

Shared Well, then the representation was explicitly false. The sprinkler system for the Property
has not been, at any time, connected to the Shared Well. Although the district court found that
the irrigation system could be set up to the Shared Well, it was not at the time of the
representation-which makes the statement false-and ample evidence demonstrates that such
an option is not a realistic possibility. For example, such evidence would include, but not be
limited to, the Humphrieses' understanding that such a connection to the Shared Well would be
illegal, that the pipe in place from the Shared Well to the Property cannot support irrigation and
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any other use at the same time, that Allen Becker knew that the connection between the Shared
Well and property was never intended for irrigation purposes, and that the Agreement, as
interpreted by the district court, does not allow for irrigation. Therefore, if the Disclosure meant
the Shared Well, it was a false statement. Regardless, the issue presents multiple genuine issues
of material fact.

If the Disclosure was intended to reference the Farm Well, then an issue of material fact
remains as to whether that representation was misleading as the Property and Beckers had no
rights to the Farm Well, which was clearly necessary to irrigate the Property. The most
reasonable inference that can be drawn from a representation on a disclosure form is that it refers
to rights pertaining to the property. This means that as a potential buyer is reading a property
disclosure form, the buyer will assume that the disclosures therein pertain to the property or that
the seller has the right to convey them.
Not only is it reasonable that the Humphries would read the Disclosure and believe that
the representation of a "private" irrigation water source meant that it was appurtenant to the
Property, and that the Property or owner had rights to convey the same as part of the sale, but it
is the most reasonable inference to be drawn from that representation. Even the Beckers' real
estate agent, Ms. Adams, implicitly acknowledged what inference would likely be drawn from
the marking of "private" when she admitted that had she known about the Farm Well, "other" as
opposed to "private" would have been checked on the Disclosure. Such an inference is sufficient
by itself to preclude summary judgment since this Court is to review the decision of the district
court and "liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and
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to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party." Anderson v.

City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 P.2d 171, 174 (1986). Therefore, if the Disclosure
referred to the Farm Well, then issues of material fact remain as to whether the representation
was misleading as the Beckers did not have any right in the Farm Well to convey.
2.

An issue of material fact remains as to what was meant by the representation of a
"shared well" under "water" in the Listing.

The district court improperly determined that the representation that the Property
received its water from a "shared well" on the Listing was not false and any misleading nature of
it was cured by the Agreement. R. MD. 8-10. In making its determination, the district court
ignored the other, more reasonable inferences, that could be drawn from that representation.
Those other inferences create an issue of fact as to what exactly was represented by the Listing.

It appears that the district court interpreted the "shared well" representation on the Listing
as the Shared Well. R. MD 8 ("Once again, this representation is not false. The source for the
water is a shared well."). However, there is at least one other inference that could be drawn
which renders this representation untrue or misleading.
The most reasonable and logical inference to be drawn by only listing the Shared Well as
the water source for the Property is that the Shared Well was the only water source to the
Property. From that inference, a potential buyer, like the Humphries, would reasonably believe
that the water in the house and the irrigation water all came from that Shared Well as the
Property has sprinklers and no other water source is listed. However, the sprinkler system was
not, in fact, connected to the Shared Well and actually drew from another water source-the
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Farm Well, which was not disclosed. Therefore, in representing the "Shared Well" as the only
source of water, a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Beckers misrepresented the
Property's sources of water by not listing or disclosing the Farm Well and its relationship to the
Property.
The Humphries recognize that the Farm Well could be characterized as a "shared well"
and an argument could be made that disclosure of a "shared well" encompassed the Farm Well.
However, such an argument would fail for three reasons. First, the entire concept of whether the
"shared well" would mean the "Farm Well" is an issue of fact as to what the representation
actually meant and therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. Second, if the Farm Well
can be considered a "shared well," then the representation of "shared well" is misleading as it is
singular, encompassing only one well, and not plural-which would be more accurate to
describe the Property being serviced by both the Shared Well and Farm Well. Lastly, on the
same page of that disclosure, it states that, "[ w]ell shared with Becker home to the south on
agreement being drawn." That confirms that the reference to the "shared well" meant the Shared
Well and not the Farm Well as the Farm Well was never part of the Agreement.
Liberally construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences m favor of the
Humphries, there remain material issues of fact as to what was meant by the "shared well"
representation on the Listing and whether that representation was misleading.
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3.

A material issue of fact remains as to whether the Disclosure and Listing, in
conjunction, created a misrepresentation and whether that misrepresentation was
cured by the Agreement.

The Disclosure and Listing, which were reviewed by the Humphries prior to making an
offer, create a misrepresentation. In the Disclosure, both the source of the domestic water and the
source of the irrigation water are marked as "private." In the Listing, the only source listed for
the water is a "shared well." Even the district court noted that the combination of these two
representations "is potentially misleading." R. MD 8, L. 4-5.
However, the district court improperly determined that the "potentially misleading"
representation was somehow cured by the Agreement. In making its finding, the district court
referred to the undefined term "domestic purposes," found in the Agreement, and, invoking the
definition for "domestic purposes" in Idaho Code § 42-111(1), determined that "[a] proper
understanding of the terms of the [A]greement would have led the Humphries to understand that
they would not be able to irrigate the entire property with the domestic well." R. MD 8-9. With
that, the district court somehow determined that no representation occurred as to what water
sources serviced the property.
The district court's analysis 1s m error for two reasons. First, there is an inherent
disconnect between the representation of a single source of water for the Property and the fact
that the Property is actually dependent upon two sources of water. That disconnect creates an
issue of fact. It is as though the district court determined that the Humphries should have been
able to guess that the disclosures meant something entirely different from what was expressly
stated-that there were actually two sources of water and not one. Second, the district court
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applied the definition found in a statute without any discussion or explanation of how the
Agreement applied to any of the statutes referenced in Idaho Code § 42-111 (1) to which that
definition is expressly confined. Again it seems that the district court expected the Humphries to
engage in divination-to guess that in the future a court may utilize a definition of "domestic
purposes" found in the Idaho Code and therefore they should consult the Idaho Code in order
find out how it defines the term even though the Agreement makes no reference to the code.
Such an expectation of a first-time homebuyer like the Humphries is unreasonable especially
when considering that the two experienced real estate agents representing the Beckers were
unable to explain what "domestic purposes" meant with certainty. 3 Based upon the inferences the
Humphries drew from the Beckers' prior representations, the Humphries had no reason to
believe that the Agreement would not cover their entire property and that they should investigate
further in order to confirm other sources of water upon which the Property depended upon and
for which the sellers had no right.
B.

The evidence in the record demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the representations made by the Beckers were misleading or false.

Looking at the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the Beckers'
representations, there are multiple material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment.
Rather than address the totality of the circumstances in a piecemeal fashion, as the district court
did, the Humphries will demonstrate that, at the very least, material issues of fact remain as to
whether the Beckers misrepresented the water sources for the Property.

3

Jerry Hines, R. 402-03; Sheila Adams, R. 392-93.
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The Beckers made two representations about the water sources. In the Disclosure, the
Beckers noted that both the domestic and irrigation water were sourced by "private" means. It is
reasonable that any prospective buyer would infer that the seller or the Property had rights to the
"private" source or sources, if there were more than one.
In the Listing, only one water source was noted-"shared well." Being singular and being
the only listed water source, a reviewer of the Listing could reasonably infer that all of the water
supplied to the Property came from a singular, shared well.
Reviewing the Disclosure and Listing together, any uncertainty about whether the
domestic water and irrigation water came from the same "private" source could be eliminated by
the inference that one "shared well" was the water source for the property. On that same
document, the source is further clarified as the Shared Well because the document states, "[w]ell
shared with Becker home to the south on agreement being drnwn."
Even though these representations address the water source for the property, they give no
indication that the sprinklers were attached to a different source than the house. In fact, the
witnesses involved admit that the Humphries would have had no way of knowing about the Farm
Well by reviewing these two documents. 4
It is reasonable that the Humphries would have gone to the closing believing, based upon

the representations made by the Beckers, that the Property was adequately and entirely serviced
by one water source-the Shared Well. Being presented with the Agreement and with no other
hint or indication prompting the Humphries to consider that the sprinklers may be sourced by the
4

Ms. Adams, R. 386-87, 498; Mr. Hines, R. 641; Allen Becker, R. 529.
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Farm Well, the Humphries would have had no reason to believe that the entire one acre Property
would be provided with water under the "domestic purposes" of the Agreement. The fact that the
term was not defined and the Beckers' two real estate agents could not give a definite definition
of "domestic purposes" shows that the presence of there is a reasonable inference that a first-time
home buyer would not question the Beckers' prior representations of the Shared Well servicing
the entire Property.
A liberal construction of the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Humphries, the Beckers' representations, not making any reference to the Farm Well, were
misleading and therefore, summary judgment in favor of the Beckers was not appropriate.
C.

The evidence in the record demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Beckers breached their duty to disclose the source of the
water to the sprinkler system.
Even if it could be found that there is no issue of material fact as to whether the Beckers'

representations were misleading, those representations triggered a duty to disclose-a duty that
the Beckers breached. The duty to disclose additional information is triggered in three situations:
"(l) if there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the two

parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if a
fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract
would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it."
Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000).

The district court acknowledged that the Beckers' representations, without more, were
"potentially misleading." R. MD 8, L. 4-5. The Disclosure and the Listing both presented
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information about the Property's water source. Neither document made any mention or hinted in
any way that the "full" and "auto" sprinkler system on the Property received its water from the
Farm Well. Presenting some facts in such a way that the presentations does not accurately reflect
the true situation is, at the very least, "a partial statement of the facts" which requires disclosure
of additional information "in order to prevent [them] from being misleading."
Additionally, in ruling on the Humphrieses' motion to amend, the district court found that
there was a reasonable likelihood that the Humphries would be able to prove that a fraud was
committed. Thus, the Court appears to have recognized on two occasions that the representations
may be misleading. That, alone, precludes summary judgment. Whether the Beckers breached
their duty to disclose is a factual question that must be decided the jury, not the district court.
Notwithstanding, the district court proceeded to weigh the evidence and made the factual
determination that the Beckers had not breached their duty to the Humphries, as reflected by its
statement that "any duty the Beckers may have had to disclose more about the source of
irrigation water was satisfied by the Joint Well Use Agreement." R. MD 9, L. 17-19. Contrary to
the district court's determination, the Agreement did not satisfy the duty to disclose more
information. The Agreement mentions nothing about the Farm Well or about the "full" and
"auto" sprinklers. In order to satisfy their duty to disclose, the Beckers would have had to
explicitly disclose that the irrigation water came from another source-a source to which the
seller had no rights.
Even if the Agreement could have satisfied the duty to disclose, such a determination on
summary judgment is improper, as it invades the province of the jury. The Beckers represented,
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from the Disclosure and Listing, that the sprinkler system was connected to and obtained water
from the shared well. A reasonable jury could conclude that the Joint Well Use Agreement
confirmed the Humphrieses' understanding that the sprinkler system was connected to the shared
well, as said Agreement makes no reference to any other source of water to the Subject Property.
In any event, whether the Joint Use Well Agreement satisfied the Beckers' duty to
disclose additional information is a factual question that must be determined by the jury.
Therefore, summary judgment was improper.
D.

The evidence in the record demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Beckers' representations concerning the sprinkler system
were material.

The Beckers represented in the Listing that the sprinklers were "full" and "auto" when in
fact, only two of the seven sprinkler stations were actually automatic. The district court
determined that such misrepresentation was not material and granted summary judgment. In so
ruling, the district court impermissibly invaded the province of the jury, as materiality is
inherently a question of fact for the jury to decide, and also impermissibly weighed the evidence.
Whether the misrepresentation is material is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
Although Idaho appellate courts have not expressly addressed the specific issue, several
jurisdictions have held that "[t]he materiality of a misrepresentation is not a matter for the trial
court but for the fact-finder." Ellis v. Liter, 841 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Ark. 1992); see e.g.,
Schurmann v. Neau, 624 N.W.2d 157 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd v.
Joseph Charles & Associates, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 677 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Powers v. United
Services Auto. Ass'n, 979 P.2d 1286 (Nev. 1999); Pitts v. Boody, 688 So. 2d 832 (Ala. Civ. App.
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1996); Campbell v. Southland Corp., 871 P.2d 487 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Guild v. More, 155
N.W. 44 (N.D. 1915); Calemine v. Samuelson, 171 Cal. App. 4th 153, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495
(2009). "To prove materiality of a misrepresentation, it is only necessary to show the
misrepresented fact was a material influence on the decision; it must have been a substantial
factor, but it is not necessary that it was the paramount or decisive inducement. This is a question
of fact for the fact-finder." Ellis, 841 S. W.2d at 156 (italics in original).
This Court should also hold that the materiality of a misrepresentation is a question of
fact for the fact-finder. In contracts, Idaho already recognizes that whether a breach was material
is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Mountain Restaurant Corp. v.

ParkCenter Mall Associates, 122 Idaho 261,265, 833 P.2d 119, 123 (1992). The Humphries are
unaware of any reason why materiality of a misrepresentation should be treated any different
than materiality in a breach of contract situation.
The district court invaded the province of the jury by weighing the evidence when it
determined that the sprinkler system representation was not material. The "weighing of evidence
and a determination of a witness's credibility ... is improper in a motion for summary judgment."

Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). In its Memorandum Decision, the
district court stated that "[t]here is no evidence indicating that the Humphries placed
considerable import on a fully automatic system . . . . " R. MD 11, L. 3-5. This statement
completely disregarded the testimony of Robert Humphries that the Humphries "would not have
made an offer to purchase the Subject Property or we would have offered to purchase it for
significantly less." R. 458-59. After the Humphries invoked that testimony once again on a
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motion to reconsider, the district court stated that it "was aware of Robert Humphries' testimony,
but found it unpersuasive because it amounts to a bare denial of arguments made by Becker in
their Motion for Summary Judgment, and is not supported by specific facts in the record." R.
700, L. 7-10. That minimization of Robert Humphries's testimony not only impermissibly
weighed the evidence, but also disregarded the summary judgment cannon that sworn testimony
"must be considered truthful." Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc.,
105 Idaho 509, 512 670 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1983).
In fact, Robert Humphries's assertion in his testimony was supported by facts in the
record. Robert had previously testified that after the Humphries made an offer on the house and
had the inspection, certain safety and adequacy issues prompted the Humphries to ask for and
receive a reduction in the price. Based upon the Humphrieses' prior behavior, it is probable that
had they known that the sprinklers were not fully automatic, that they would have, at the very
least, requested a reduction in the price of the house as they had for other issues they discovered.
This fact does not even take into consideration the fact that this was the Humphrieses' first home
and the thought of having to convert manual sprinklers to automatic sprinklers may have been
overwhelming for them-regardless of the costs or actual difficulty involved. In any event,
whether the truth of the sprinklers would have affected the amount the Humphries would payand, in tum, whether a mutual price would have been reached and the sale executed-is a
question of fact for the trier of fact.
The district court erred when it weighed the evidence and determined that the Beckers'
misrepresentation regarding the functionality of the sprinklers was not material.
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II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE HUMPHRIESES' IDAHO PROPERTY
CONDITION DISCLOSURE ACT CLAIM
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court held that Eileen Becker did not breach her
duties under the Idaho Property Condition Disclosure Act (the "Act") because she "checked the
boxes for 'private system' under the only portion of the form dedicated to the source of water."
R. MD 12, L. 1-3. It is unclear from the district court's decision whether the Court held that the
checking of that box was sufficient because the Farm Well-to which the sprinkler system was
connected-was "private" or whether it refers to the Shared Well since the Shared Well was the
only water source to which the Beckers had any rights. 5 Either way, the representation is
misleading and ignores the fact that an option for selection that was not misleading was
available.
The Act requires certain disclosures by the seller of real property. I.C. § 55-2504. The
disclosures are designed to "permit the transferor to disclose material matters relating to the
physical condition of the property to be transferred, including, but not limited to, the source of
water supply to the property .... " LC. § 55-2506. Failure to comply with the Act subjects the
seller to liability for the damages suffered by the buyer. LC. § 55-2517.
If the district court was referring to the Farm Well as "private," then the Beckers'

representation was misleading because the Beckers had no rights to convey in the Farm Well.

5 While previously in its decision, the district court did state that since the "Private System" could have meant either
the Farm Well or the Shared Well, in the section addressing the Act, the Court did not expressly clarify whether it
was referring to one or both interpretations.
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The assumption in a property disclosure is that the water sources would be disclosed and would
be sources to which the seller had rights-unless, of course, further explanation is provided. No
further explanation was provided identifying the Farm Well as a source of water to the Property
and that the buyer would not have any rights to that source. Therefore, referencing the Farm Well
as the "private" source of irrigation water violated the Act, and summary judgment was not
appropriate.

If the district court was referring to the Shared Well as the source identified by the
Beckers in the Disclosure, then the Beckers' representation was misleading because the sprinkler
system was not connected to the Shared Well, a fact which the Beckers knew prior to selling the
Property.
The district court ignored the fact that the Beckers could have chosen a less misleading
option, such as "other," checked no box at all, or written in that the buyers would have no right
to the irrigation water source. Considering that the Shared Well was not connected to the
sprinklers and that the Beckers had no rights to the Farm Well, "other" would be a much less
misleading selection. Even the Beckers' real estate agent who listed the property for them stated
that had she known the true nature of the sprinkler system, that "other" would have been the
more appropriate selection. Such a selection, at the very least, would give buyers an indication
that there was something about the irrigation water that they needed to inquire about.
Additionally, considering the marking of "private" is misleading, the Beckers could have written
in a clarification so that the selection was not misleading. The Beckers did neither and simply
misled potential buyers by representing the irrigation source as "private."
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The very fact that it is unclear which water source the Beckers were referring to when
marking "private" creates an issue of material fact. A subsequent issue of material fact arises as
to the misleading nature of whichever water source the Beckers were representing under
"irrigation source," whether it be the Shared Well-which was not connected--or the Farm
Well-to which the Beckers had no rights. Therefore, issues of fact remain as to whether the
Beckers complied with the Act.

III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN A WARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE BECKERS
The district court erroneously granted summary judgment m favor of the Beckers.
Subsequently, the district court granted an award of attorney's fees for the Beckers, as the prevailing
party. R. 746-52. "In order to be awarded attorney's fees, one must be a prevailing party." Smith v.

Whittier, 107 Idaho 1106, 1108, 695 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1985). However, summary judgment was
inappropriate, and therefore the Beckers are not entitled to attorney's fees. See Rockefeller v.

Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 637 (2001) (vacating an award of attorney's fees after reversing
the grant of summary judgment).
IV.
THE HUMPHRIES ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL UNDER THE
UNDERLYING CONTRACT AND IDAHO APPELLATE
RULES 40 AND 41
The underlying contract which served as the basis of sale of the Property, provides that,
"[i]f either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceedings which are in
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any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the
non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on
appeal." R. 419.
This court should award costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal. The district court
erred when it granted summary judgment. There were numerous issues of material fact that
should have precluded summary judgment, and the district court's decision should be reversed.
Upon reversal, this Court should award the Humphries costs and attorney's fees as the prevailing
party. See Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670
P.2d 1294 (1983) (awarding costs to the appellant who successfully challenged the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to the appellees).
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CONCLUSION
The Beckers made various representations about the water source to the Property. However,
none of those representations gave any indication that the irrigation water source was one to which
the Beckers had no right to convey. There is enough evidence to show that those representations
were misleading, giving rise to the false statement/misrepresentation element of fraud. At the very
least, whether those representations were misleading are questions of fact for the trier of fact to
determine. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate and the Humphries ask this Court to
reverse the district court's decision and remand so that this case may be appropriately tried before a
Jury.
DATED this 2!51 day of August, 2014.
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 21 st day of August, 2011, he caused two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:
Brooke B. Redmond
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O. Box 226
Twin Falls, ID 83303
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